Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study by Stoll, Sebastian & Zöttl, Gregor
Sebastian Stoll and Gregor Zöttl:
Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding
Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2012-17
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13112/
Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding
Procurement Auctions
Sebastian Stoll∗, Gregor Zo¨ttl†
February 28, 2013
Abstract. We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and non-
price characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such
auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the
bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether it is in the buyer’s interest to disclose
or to conceal non-price information depends on the precise relationship between bidders’
procurement cost and their qualities. We empirically study the impact of a change in the
information structure using data from a large European online procurement platform. In
a counterfactual analysis we analyze the reduction of non-price information available to
the bidders. We find that on average bidders’ price quotes would increase by 5%, auction
turnover would increase by 8%, and buyers’ welfare would be reduced by 8%.
Keywords: Procurement, Non-Binding Auctions, Supply Chain Management
∗Sebastian Stoll, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Kaulbachstr. 45, D-80539 Munich,
Germany. Email: sebastian.stoll@lrz.uni-muenchen.de.
†Gregor Zo¨ttl, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstr. 28, D-80539 Munich, Ger-
many. Email: zoettl@lmu.de. Sebastian Stoll gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) through GRK 801.
1
1 Introduction
When procuring a contract the buyer often is not only interested in the price of an
offer but also in other, non-price dimensions such as technical characteristics of the good
or time of delivery. A by now quite well studied multidimensional auction format is given
by scoring auctions where buyers prior to the bidding process establish a binding scoring
rule. Besides such highly structured auctions recently “non-binding” or “buyer-determined”
auctions became increasingly important. In these auctions buyers can freely assign the
contract after bidding has taken place. Currently this auction format seems to establish
itself as the most prominent one for online marketplaces both for private and commercial
contractors.1
When designing non-binding procurement auctions, typically no structure is imposed
on the buyer’s decision process - he is entirely free to choose any of the submitted bids.
Important design questions arise, however, with respect to the optimal information structure
for the bidding process. That is, bidders can be provided with different levels of information
regarding the buyers preferences over both the price and the non-price characteristics of the
offers.
In the present article we shed light on the optimal design of the information structure
of non-binding reverse auctions, using an extensive dataset from a large European online
procurement platform. Our analysis focuses on the impact of transparency of the auction
design with respect to the buyers’ valuations of bidders’ non-price characteristics. We find
that concealing all non-price information on average leads to an increase of bidders’ price
quotes by 5%, an increase of auction turnover by 8%, and a reduction of buyers’ welfare by
8%.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we establish two different formal frameworks
which describe two limiting cases of information structures: In the first case bidders are
1See Jap (2002, 2003), Jap and Haruvy (2008), and compare for example the platform FedBid, Inc.,
where US government agencies have procured more than $4.1 billion worth of purchases since 2008 using
non-binding auctions.
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fully informed both about the non-price characteristics of their rivals and about the buyers’
preferences over their own and their rivals’ non-price characteristics. In the second case,
all quality information is concealed from the bidders. We show that whether or not it is
beneficial for buyers to reveal quality information depends on characteristics of the market
considered, namely the relationship between the differences in the bidders’ costs and that in
their qualities.
Our empirical analysis is based on a detailed data set of an online procurement platform,
where subscribed buyers post their tenders and can freely choose among the posted bids.
For the observed period all quality information is publicly available to bidders, and we
can show that bidders’ observed behavior is indeed in line with our model for the case of
disclosed quality information. Based on this framework we conduct a counterfactual analysis
and determine the impact of concealing quality information from the bidders. That is, we
first derive estimates of the bidders’ costs based on the current setting and then determine
counterfactual auction outcomes for the case of concealed non-price information. We find
that if non-price information was not available to the bidders, on average their price quotes
would increase by 5%, expected auction turnover would increase by 8%, and expected buyers’
welfare would be reduced by the monetary equivalent of 8%. Our analysis thus shows that
the decision whether or not to reveal quality information to the bidders has an economically
significant impact on auction outcomes.
Our work adds to a relatively new strand of literature which analyzes non-binding auc-
tions. We are especially interested in the effect of different information structures in this
auction format. There already are some theoretical papers which analyze the conditions
under which it is beneficial for the buyer in non-binding auctions to inform bidders about
their qualities. Gal-Or et al. (2007) show that under simultaneous bid submission the buyer
is better off when he discloses quality information to the bidders. Extensions such as the
inclusion of risk averse bidders are provided in Doni and Menicucci (2010). Colucci et al.
(2011) extend the setting of Gal-Or et al. (2007) by introducing heterogeneity in bidders’
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costs. They demonstrate that for the case of large costs differences and a comparatively
small weighting of quality aspects it is in the best interest of the buyer to conceal quality
information. In the opposite case, he is better off disclosing information about the bidders’
quality.2 To shed more light on these theoretical results, Haruvy and Katok (2010) conduct
laboratory experiments to analyze both open and sealed bid non-binding auctions. For the
environments chosen in their experiments they find that in their open auction design buyers
are better off if they keep information about bidders’ qualities concealed. To the best of
our knowledge our article is the first one to analyze non-binding auctions based on field
data. Interestingly, we find that buyers would be worse off if all information with respect to
non-price characteristics was concealed.
Wan and Beil (2012) and Wan et al. (2012) analyze a related but slightly different prob-
lem, they study auctions where bidders in order to win the auction additionally have to
meet certain quality standards. Those articles explore theoretically and experimentally un-
der which conditions it is optimal to provide information with respect to the screening among
bidders either prior or after bidding has taken place.
Our work in general contributes to the literature which analyzes efficient ways to procure
contracts when the buyer’s valuation of an offer depends on additional dimensions besides
price. Scoring auctions (where binding scoring rules take price and non-price characteristics
into account) have already received significant attention in the literature and by now are quite
well understood. Asker and Cantillon (2008, 2010) show that for the case when suppliers
have multi-dimensional private information this procurement mechanism dominates others
like sequential bargaining and price-only auctions. Different scoring auction designs are
compared in Che (1993), Branco (1997), Chen-Ritzo et al. (2005) and Kostamis et al. (2009).
Empirical analysis of scoring auctions can be found in Athey and Levin (2001) and Lewis
and Bajari (2011), the first using data from US timber auctions and the second data from
US highway procurement auctions. Practical implementability of scoring auctions through
2For a similar setting Rezende (2009) shows that when the buyer and the suppliers have the possibility
to renegotiate, it can be optimal for the buyer to fully reveal the information about the suppliers’ qualities.
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iterative process is analyzed for example in Bichler and Kalagnanam (2005) or Parkes and
Kalagnanam (2005).
In practice non-binding auctions have established as a prominent format to take price
and non-price characteristics into account. Several articles compare the performance of
this format as compared to scoring auctions. Che (1993) shows that when bidders bid on
all dimensions of their offers, from the buyer’s perspective scoring auctions dominate non-
binding auctions. In contrast, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) show that when bidders’
non-price characteristics are exogenously given and they only bid on price, the non-binding
auction format is preferred by the buyer when the number of participating bidders is high
enough. Katok and Wambach (2011) find that when bidders are uncertain about the exact
way different criteria enter the final decision of the buyer, there are cases where a non-
binding auction enables them to coordinate on high prices. In that case the buyer would
prefer binding price-only auctions over non-binding auctions.
2 Theory
 Framework. We consider an open and non-binding procurement situation where a
buyer wants to procure some contract among J participating firms. Each firm has some
cost cj for providing the service. For a certain period of time t ∈ [0, T ] bidding firms can
continuously submit publically observable prices. We denote the vector of final prices quoted
at the end of the submission period by each firm by p = (p1, ..., pJ). Once price submission
has finished the buyer can freely choose to award the contract to some firm j at price pj.
For the buyer’s decision not only the final price pj quoted by firm j matters but also its
non-price characteristics which result in a certain quality relevant for the buyer which we
denote by qj.
3 The way firms’ qualities and prices influence the buyer’s decision is established
3In more formal terms the quality of some firm j, qj , is some function g of that firm’s non-price character-
istics, Aj , and the respective preferences α of the buyer, that is qj = g(α,Aj). For our theoretical analysis
it is not necessary to define quality at this level, but the definition will come in handy for our empirical
analysis.
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in detail in expression (1).
Before the selling process starts we assume that nature draws the vector of qualities
assigned to the firms, q = (q1, ..., qJ). After the draw we assume that the buyer is informed
about the firms’ qualities q. With respect to the information firms receive about their
qualities we differentiate between two cases: In the first case, which we call information case
(IC), in addition also all firms are informed about q, that is in the information case q is
common knowledge. In the other case, which we call no information case (NIC), q remains
concealed from the firms, that is in the no information case the buyer knows each firm’s
quality but the firms know neither their own nor their rivals’ qualities.
We assume that the buyer can choose among J firms and an outside option. He receives
a certain amount of utility uj when he chooses firm j. This amount of utility depends on the
price pj put forward by this firm and the firm’s exogenous quality qj. We model the utility
a buyer receives from a certain firm as being linearly dependent on the price pj, the firm’s
quality qj, and an error term j. With that, the buyer’s decision process is given as
max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = 0
u1 = −p1 + q1 + 1
... (1)
uJ = −pJ + qJ + J
As for the behavior of the buyer and that of the firms only differences in both qualities and
utilities matter, we can assume without loss of generality that the utility the buyer derives
from the outside option equals zero. The error terms j capture uncertainty in the buyer’s
decision due to unobserved influences unrelated to price or the observed quality aspects.4
We assume the j to follow a symmetric distribution with mean zero. When making his
4For example the buyer might be influenced in his decision by his (unobserved) taste regarding for
example the username firm j chooses at a bidding platform.
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decision, the realizations of the j are known to the buyer, but they remain concealed from
the firms while bidding. The buyer is assumed to choose the option which maximizes his
utility, i.e. the option k for which
uk > uj ∀j 6= k, j, k ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Our research interest lies in the implications of availability of quality information to
the firms in open and non-binding auctions. In order to develop an understanding of the
mechanisms at play we look at two polar cases of information structures: In the first case,
the information case (IC), firms are assumed to have full information about both their own
quality and their rivals’ qualities. In the second case, the no information case (NIC), firms
are assumed to have no information at all with respect to their own and their rivals’ qualities.
 Information case: In the information case we assume that every firm j has full
information about its own quality qj, its rivals’ qualities qk, and the prices pk its rivals put
forward. We also assume that firms are fully informed about the way the buyer makes
his decision - that is, the firms perceive the buyer to decide according to maximization
problem (1). In contrast to the buyer, who knows the realizations of the j when making his
decision, from the firms’ perspectives the j are random. We assume that the unobservables
j follow some distribution, and that the firms know the distribution the j are drawn from.
In consequence, given some bid pj of its own, firm j can derive all winning probabilities
Pk(p,q), k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, which are functions of all firms’ final price bids p = (p1, ..., pJ)
and all firms’ qualities q. We assume that the winning probability Pk of each firm k is log
concave in its final price quote.5 Expected profits pij of firm j are given by
pij = Pj(p,q)(pj − cj).
We can now determine the Nash equilibrium in final prices p = (p1, ..., pJ) submitted by
the firms at the end of each bidding period where each firm chooses its final price bid as a
5Notice that the Logit framework referred to from section 4 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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best reply to all other firms’ final price bids. As usual for the price setting market game,
the equilibrium can be characterized by the first order conditions of each firm with respect
to the final price bid submitted.6 This is summarized in the subsequent proposition.
Proposition 1. In the information case there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in final price
quotes. It is characterized by
pj +
Pj
∂Pj/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (2)
.Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium have already been shown in the literature,
compare Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) and Mizuno (2003).
 No information case: In the no information case we assume that firms do know that
given a certain draw of qualities q the buyer makes his decision according to the maximization
problem given by (1), but that they do not know which qualities q were actually drawn, that
is they neither know the qualities of their rivals nor their own quality. In addition, firms
are assumed not to have more information about their own quality than about their rivals’
qualities.7 (Of course, they also do not know the realizations of the j.). In addition, we
assume that firms have symmetric beliefs about the distribution of quality in the population,
and that they believe the draws of the qualities q1, ..., qJ to be independent from each other.
We assume the qj to follow a symmetric distribution. Then, from the point of view of the
firms the buyer decides as if he had the following decision problem:
6The current framework relies on the standard assumptions underlying Bertrand competition, where
firms’ costs are common knowledge. Notice, however, that the same result would obtain in the limit of
alternating myopically best responses of firms without common knowledge of cost, e.g. compare Fudenberg
and Levine (1998). Experimental evidence that players significantly underestimate their rivals’ rationality
can be found for example in Weizsaecker (2003).
7We make this assumption for two reasons: First, if we assumed that each bidder had more information
about his own quality than his rivals, bidders would in essence play a signaling game, and this would render
the theoretical analysis intractable. Second, with regard to our later application, we think this assumption is
a sensible approximation of a bidder’s information state if information about the buyer’s preferences α and
his rivals’ non-price characteristics Aj are concealed from him: Of course the bidder is still informed about his
own non-price characteristics, but without sufficiently detailed information about the buyer’s preferences he
cannot transform this information into meaningful information about his own (relative) quality. (Remember
that a bidder’s quality qj is some function of that bidder’s non-price characteristics Aj and the buyer’s
respective preferences α.)
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max
j∈{0,1,...,J}
uj, where
u0 = 0
u1 = −p1 + ˜1
... (3)
uJ = −pJ + ˜J
where ˜j = qj + j. This means in the no information case firms behave as if the buyer made
his decision based only on their prices pj and error terms ˜j.
Under the assumption that firms know the distribution of the j and the distribution of
the qj they can derive the distribution of the ˜j = qj + j and thus their winning probabil-
ities. Therefore, given some bid pj of its own, firm j can derive beliefs about all winning
probabilities P˜k, k ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}. We assume that the winning probability P˜k of each firm k
is log concave in its final price quote.8 Expected profit p˜ij of firm j is then given by
p˜ij = P˜j(p) · (pj − cj) . (4)
We obtain the Nash equilibrium in final price quotes, in the no information case those are
based on the winning probabilities P˜k, however.
Proposition 2. In the no information case there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in final
price quotes. It is characterized by
pj +
P˜j
∂P˜j/∂pj
− cj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}. (5)
.Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium have already been shown in the literature,
compare Caplin and Nalebuff (1991) and Mizuno (2003).
 Comparing both information regimes: We are interested in whether the buyer
prefers to disclose or to conceal quality information. This decision clearly has to be taken
8Notice that the Logit framework referred to from section 4 onwards satisfies this assumption.
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prior to knowing the precise number and identity of the participating firms and their quality.
The buyer then will prefer the information structure which gives him the highest expected
utility. As we summarize in the subsequent theorem neither information regime dominates
the other.
Proposition 3. There is no information structure which dominates the other.
Proof. See appendix A.1.
The central intuition is that from the buyer’s point of view the informational arrangement
which creates the highest competitive pressure among firms is the preferable one. Which
information regime creates more competitive pressure as perceived by the firms depends on
the specific situation considered, as we show. First, consider for example a situation where
firms have similar production cost but very different qualities. A regime which conceals non-
price information suggests tough competition and induces more aggressive bidding. Second,
consider a situation where firms have quite different production cost but quality differences
are such as to compensate for those differences (i.e. the more expensive producer also
has higher quality). In this case the full revelation of non-price information induces more
aggressive bidding. In the subsequent section we find a detailed illustration of those tradeoffs.
 Illustration of tradeoffs and model mechanics: For every standard assumption
about the distribution of the j (normal or type I extreme value) the winning probabilities
Pj either cannot be expressed in closed form or contain exponential terms which lead to
transcendental equations. Thus, for any standard assumption about the distribution of the
j the first order conditions (2) cannot be solved analytically. The same holds for the ˜j and
the P˜j.
In order to nevertheless gain further insights into the mechanics of our model we make
use of the fact that the winning probabilities of the bidding firms can be approximated by a
first order series approximation. Details regarding the approximation are given in appendix
A.2. Using this approximation, we analyze bidding in an auction where the buyer can only
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choose among two firms.9 We assume that firm 1 is of low quality and low costs, while firm
2 is of high quality and high costs (i.e. q1 < q2 and c1 < c2). Firm one’s perception of its
winning probability in the information case, P1, and its perception of its winning probability
in the no information case, P˜1, are given as
P1(p,q) =
1
2
+
1
a
(p1 − p2 + q1 − q2), (6)
P˜1(p) =
1
2
+
1
a˜
(p1 − p2). (7)
The coefficients a and a˜ depend on the variances of j and ˜j. It holds that 0 < a ≤ a˜ < 1.
The winning probabilities of firm two are simply P2 = 1− P1 and P˜2 = 1− P˜1.
Relationship between the firms’ equilibrium bids: By making use of the first order
conditions established in theorems 1 and 2 we can derive equilibrium bids in either case.10
We directly turn towards the comparison of equilibrium bids for either information regime:
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)− 1
2
(a˜− a), (8)
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)− 1
2
(a˜− a). (9)
The intuition behind expressions (8) and (9) is straightforward: The first term added to
p˜∗2 respectively subtracted from p˜
∗
1 captures that in case of disclosed quality information firms
become aware of firm two’s competitive advantage in terms of quality: The net competitive
pressure on the low-quality firm (firm one) increases, while that on the high-quality firm (firm
two) decreases. The last term in expressions (8) and (9) captures that in case of concealed
quality information firms perceive the buyer’s decision to be more random and thus add an
additional uncertainty markup on their costs.
9This means we implicitly assume that the value of the outside option is so low that the upper limit to
the prices of firm 1 and 2 is above the equilibrium prices. The outside option simply leads to upper limits
for the prices of firm 1 and 2. Thus its explicit treatment would only make our analysis more complicated
without delivering further insights.
10Those are given as follows: p∗1 =
1
3 (2c1 + c2)− 13 (q2 − q1) + a2 and p∗2 = 13 (c1 + 2c2) + 13 (q2 − q1) + a2 for
the information case, p˜∗1 =
1
3 (2c1 + c2) +
a˜
2 and p˜
∗
2 =
1
3 (c1 + 2c2) +
a˜
2 for the no information case.
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Relationship between the buyer’s expected utilities: In appendix A.2 we use
results from Small and Rosen (1981) to derive the expected utility of the buyer in the
information case, EU, and that in the no information case, E˜U. Again we directly turn
towards the comparison of the expected utilities for either information regime:
EU− E˜U = 1
3a
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+
1
4
(2aa˜+ a˜2 − 3a2) (10)
+(
a˜
2a
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1)
Equation (10) shows that the net change in the expected utility of the buyer depends on
three factors: The first term captures the tradeoff between the competitive advantage of the
low-cost firm and that of the high-quality firm. If the difference in costs is small but that in
qualities is very high, disclosure of quality information weakens competition because firms
become aware of the high-quality firm’s large net advantage. If in contrast the difference in
costs is very high and that in qualities small, disclosure of quality information strengthens
competition as it mitigates the net advantage of the low-cost firm. The second term captures
that in the no information case firms perceive the decision of the buyer to be more random.
In the no information case they thus demand an uncertainty markup on their prices which
in turn decreases buyer’s welfare. The third term weighs the effect of uncertainty on buyer’s
welfare (term two) against that of quality information (term one). The weight of either
effect depends on how strong relative to costs firms’ pricing decisions are influenced by
quality information. The smaller the influence of quality information, the more the effect of
uncertainty outweighs that of quality information.
The graphs in figure 1 illustrate how the buyer’s preferences regarding the information
structure change as a function of the auction parameters, namely the firms’ costs, their qual-
ities, and the difference between the variance of the j and that of the ˜j. The parameter
sizes used for this simulation exercise resemble typical parameter sizes from our applica-
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Figure 1: Preferences of the buyer regarding the information structure as a function of the
auction parameters. The graphs show the indifference line of the buyer. The indifference line of the
buyer represents the parameter set at which the buyer is indifferent between both information structures.
We assumed that c1 = 4.5 and q1 = 0.3. These parameters sizes resemble typical parameter sizes from our
application. For all q2-c2-combinations above the indifference lines the buyer prefers the no information case
over the information case, for all combinations below he prefers the information case over the no information
case. For the left graph we assumed that in the no information case firms do not perceive the buyer’s decision
to be more random than in the information case. For the right graph we assumed that the firms’ perception
of uncertainty in the no information case equals that in our data (which in technical terms means that
Var[˜j ] = 1.55Var[j ]). For the parameter space depicted our approximation is good (see appendix A.2).
tion.11 The important take-away is that which information structure to choose for a certain
application is not clear ex ante but depends on the specific situation analyzed.
3 Data
We have available an extensive dataset from a popular European online procurement
platform. On this platform private customers tender jobs ranging from construction over
general repair and renovation to teaching. Jobs are awarded through an open non binding
auction.
The exact procedure is as follows: A private customer (respectively buyer) posts a de-
11The average quality in our data is 0.3 (as a lookahead to section 4 this equals the average value of αAj).
The average (estimated) costs are 450 euros. In “utility-units” this is 4.5 (which equals the average value of
ρcj). For our simulation we set q1 = 0.3 and c1 = 4.5.
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Mean SD Median Min Max
Nbr. of bidders per auction 7.83 4.38 7 2 26
Bid amount 559.33 514.03 400 48 18,830
Startprice 508.30 386.65 400 100 2000
Nbr. of auction participations per bidder 3.73 9.04 1 1 170
Auctions per buyer 1.01 0.10 1 1 2
Auction duration (days) 8.47 6.85 5.98 0.05 65.95
Last bid placement (hours till auction end) 24.28 55.50 3.98 0 610.27
Share of auctions with last bid submission
less than one hour before auction end: 31%
Percentage of his rivals a certain
bidder encounters at least twice 0.12 0.15 0 0 1
Nbr. of auctions 1,928
Nbr. of bidders 2,670
Nbr. of buyers 1,907
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for auctions with an announced startprice of less or equal than 2000 EUR
and with both costs information and information about bidders’ characteristics available.
scription of the job he wants to be procured. This description is entered into a free-text field
and usually contains job details like for example the area to be painted or whether or not
cleaning is required, the job site, a price expectation (termed startprice in the following) and
an announcement of the time span during which tradesmen (respectively bidders) can put
forward quotes. All this information is available to all tradesmen registered at the platform.
During the defined time span all tradesmen who are interested can publically announce prices
for which they are willing to procure the job offered. Announced prices can be changed at
any point during the auction. The current price quote of each bidder and all his non-price
characteristics are publicly observable on the website. The non-price characteristics include
the number of positive and negative ratings the bidder received so far, his home location,
qualifications like the possession of certain degrees and his area of expertise. Highlighted
among the non-price characteristics are a bidder’s ratings. At the end of the auction the
buyer is free to award the job to one of the bidders or to withdraw his offer. In case of an
award the platform obtains a certain percentage of the successful bid as commission.
In the following, we concentrate on data from auctions on painting and wallpapering jobs.
For 2,126 auctions we have collected information about costs factors of the jobs offered (like
for example the area to be painted, whether paint is provided by the buyer, and so on). In
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of auctions. The spatial distribution of the 1,928 auctions which were
conducted in the 2nd half of 2008 and for which we have collected costs information is displayed.
addition, for every auction we have information about the number and the identities of the
participating bidders, the prices put forward, the bidder’s non-price characteristics and the
final choice of the potential buyer (including whether or not he chose to withdraw his job
offer). All the auctions considered took place during the second half of the year 2008.
When posting a job offer, every buyer also sets a so called startprice. The startprice is
set for purely informational reasons, it neither puts any restriction on bids submitted nor on
the award decision taken by the potential buyer. In 3% of the auctions under consideration
a startprice of more than 2000 EUR is set. A major part of these auctions aims at procuring
jobs with special requirements, e.g. the use of scaffolding. As there is not enough information
in the data to sufficiently control for special costs elements like that, for the following analysis
we drop all auctions with startprices of more than 2000 EUR. In addition, as in order to
confirm whether bidders’ pricing behavior is in line with our information case framework we
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study bidders’ reactions to competitors’ qualities (see appendix A.3), we use only auctions in
which at least two bidders participate. We are left with 1,928 auctions. Descriptive statistics
for these auctions are given in table 1. Figure 2 shows the spatial distribution of these.
4 Counterfactual analysis
The goal of our counterfactual analysis is to determine the impact of availability of
quality information on the aggregate welfare of the buyers. In the market setting of our data
information about bidders’ non-price characteristics is publicly available and bidders can infer
information about the preferences of the buyers form observing the buyers’ former decisions.
Thus the observed market outcome should be well described by our information case model.
We verify this assumption by testing empirically whether bidders’ observed behavior is in
line with the predictions of the information case model. In particular, we employ a reduced
form model to analyze bidders’ reactions to quality shocks. Details regarding this analysis
can be found in appendix A.3. As implied by our information case model, we find that
bidders react to the appearance of an high-quality rival with drastic price reductions. This
finding confirms our assumption that our information case model describes actual bidders’
behavior well.
The first step in our counterfactual analysis is to elicit information about the bidders’
qualities by estimating the buyers’ preferences from their observed decisions. Together with
our model for the bidders’ behavior in the information case we use the information about
bidders’ qualities gained to derive estimates of the bidders’ costs. We then use these costs
estimates together with our model for the bidders’ behavior in the counterfactual no informa-
tion case to see what would happen to buyers’ welfare if quality information was concealed
from the bidders.12
12Note that in practice concealment of quality information can easily be achieved through two channels:
First, making information about a bidder’s non-price characteristics exclusively available to the buyers but
not to his rivals. And second, undertaking measures which make it more difficult for bidders to assess the
quality of their own non-price characteristics, such as offering predefined input masks for job descriptions
which do not directly foresee to convey quality preferences of buyers.
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 Estimation of the buyers’ preferences. We elicit the buyers’ preferences using
a logit discrete choice model: For a given auction n we model the decision of the buyer
of that auction as a discrete choice among all the participating bidders and an outside
option. The buyer is assumed to base his decision among the bidders on the prices put
forward and the non-price characteristics of each bidder. Bidders’ non-price characteristics
comprise binary characteristics, indicating for example the possession of certain degrees,
discrete characteristics like number of positive ratings and number of negative ratings, and
a continuous measure for the distance between bidder j’s home location and the job site.13
 Econometric model. We estimate the buyers’ preferences along the lines of the
model we developed in section 2: a certain buyer’s utility from choosing an alternative is
assumed to be linearly dependent on the price pnj of that alternative, its quality qnj and
an error term nj. A bidder’s quality is defined as some function of that bidder’s non-price
characteristics and the buyer’s respective preferences. We assume that a bidder’s quality qnj
depends linearly on that bidder’s characteristics and the preferences of the buyer over this
characteristics. With Anj subsuming the non-price characteristics of bidder j in auction n,
and α denoting the preferences of the buyer over these characteristics, the quality qnj of
bidder j in auction n is given by αAnj.
14 With ρ denoting the price elasticity of the buyer
in auction n, the utility he derives one each of the Jn participating bidders can explicitly be
13The distance measure is constructed from the buyer’s and the bidders’ zip-codes. As such it is only
approximate. However, given the assumption that also the buyers can in general be expected to base their
decision on a rough distance estimate and not an exact calculation, it should suffice to capture the respective
part of the buyers’ decisions.
14For simplicity we are assuming that each buyer has the same preferences α. We could replace this
assumption by assuming that the preferences α of the buyers follow a normal distribution and accordingly
estimate a mixed logit model. However, this more involved approach does not deliver significantly different
results.
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formulated as15
un1 = ρpn1 + αAn1 + n1
... (11)
unJn = ρpnJn + αAnJn + nJn .
The error terms nj capture unobserved influences on the buyer’s decision unrelated to bid-
ders’ prices or their observed qualities. The buyer is assumed to choose the alternative
which offers him the highest utility. By assuming the error terms nj to be independently,
identically type I extreme value distributed we obtain the standard logit model: The choice
probabilities are given as
Pnj =
eρpnj+αAnj∑Jn
k=1 e
ρpnk+αAnk
.
Estimates of the model parameters {ρ,α} can be obtained by maximizing the likelihood
L =
N∏
n=1
Jn∏
j=0
(Pnj)
ynj , ynj =

1 if alternative j is chosen in auction n,
0 otherwise.
 Estimation results. We estimated our model on all auctions from the painting
and wallpapering category with an announced startprice of at most 2000 EUR, which were
conducted during the second half of 2008, and for which we have costs information available.
Table 2 shows the results. The first column displays the coefficient estimates {ρˆ, αˆ}, the
second column the respective average marginal effects. Besides by some controls, a buyer’s
decision seems to be strongly influenced by the bidders’ prices and the way bidders have
been rated by former buyers: on average a price reduction of 10 EUR leads to an increase
15Note that we did not include intercepts in the utility specifications for the bidders 1 to Jn. As only
differences in utilities matter for the buyers’ decisions, that does not put any restrictions on our discrete
choice model. We also did not include an outside option into our model. The reason is that in our dataset the
outside option is never chosen and we thus do not have variation in our data from which to draw meaningful
information about the value of the outside option.
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Covariates in Coefficient estimates Average marginal effects
buyer’s utility fct.
Bid amount (EUR) -.011∗∗∗ -.0010∗∗∗
(.0004) (.00006)
Nbr. of positive ratings .016∗∗∗ .0014∗∗∗
(.001) (.0001)
Nbr. of negative ratings -.108∗∗∗ -.0097∗∗∗
(.014) (.0012)
Controls:
Nbr. of employees -.012 -.0011
Distance (km) -.006∗∗∗ -.0005∗∗∗
Trade License .292∗∗∗ .0263∗∗∗
Master craftsman company .138 .0124
Senior journeyman company .077 .0070
Other certifications .024 .0021
In craftsmen register .290∗∗∗ .0261∗∗∗
Nbr. of observations 15,100
Nbr. of auctions 1,928
Table 2: Results of the estimation of the logit discrete choice model. The estimates are based
on data from 1,928 auctions. The startprice set in all these auctions is less than 2,000 EUR. In all these
auctions we observed 15,100 bids (on average, a buyer made his decision among eight bids, the outside option
included). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%,
**: 5%, *: 10%.
of the bidder’s winning probability of around 1%, 10 positive ratings lead to an increase of
about 1.3%, and 10 negative ratings reduce it by about 9%. For comparison: the average
bid amount is about 560 EUR, the average number of positive ratings is 21, and the average
number of negative ratings is 2.
Our results hinge on the assumption that the error terms nj in (11) are neither correlated
with the prices pnj nor with the bidders’ attributes Anj. In other words, for our estimation
results to be consistent there must be no unobserved factors which influence the buyers’
utilities in a way systematically connected to our observables. However, as we analyze
auctions conducted on an online marketplace and as we were provided with very detailed
recordings of these auctions, we are convinced that we are able to control for all factors which
have a systematic influence on the buyers’ utilities: Our data contains exactly the amount
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of information about the bidders the buyers have available when making their decisions.
Thus, there should be no influences on the buyers’ utilities which are both unobserved and
in some way systematically connected to the bidders’ attributes. Thus, it should hold that
the nj are uncorrelated with the bidders’ attributes Anj and their prices pnj, which implies
consistency of our estimation results.
 Estimation of bidders’ costs. Our goal is to calculate the change in buyers’ welfare
if quality information were concealed from the bidders. To calculate the change in buyers’
welfare we need information about bidders’ counterfactual prices. If we had information
about bidders costs cnj we could calculate bidders’ counterfactual prices employing our no
information case model.16 We do not have explicit cost information, but as observed bidders’
behavior is in line with our model for the case of disclosed quality information (compare
appendix A.3) we can use this model to derive estimates of the bidders’ costs cnj from the
observed prices pnj:
The basic assumption in our model for the case of disclosed quality information is that
in each auction bidders are informed about each other’s qualities. As a bidder’s quality is
given as a function of that bidder’s non-price attributes and the buyer’s preferences over
these attributes, that implies that bidders are informed about both each other’s non-price
attributes and the respective preferences of the buyer. In our data we have available infor-
mation about each bidder’s non-price attributes, and we make the assumption that in each
auction bidders meet a representative buyer whose preferences (ρ, α) equal our preference
estimates (ρˆ, αˆ) (compare table 2).
Our assumption that bidders’ behavior can be described by our model for the information
case implies that the observed bids pnj are equilibrium bids which for every auction n solve
16We have available information about the cost factors of each auction, but we do not have information
about each bidders’ opportunity costs. We think for our application opportunity costs can be expected to
be quite heterogeneous, as bidders are very diverse (the spectrum ranges from private persons to profes-
sionals from medium-sized firms). Thus, without information on opportunity costs we do not have sufficient
information on bidders’ costs cnj .
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the bidders’ first order conditions
pnj +
Pnj
∂Pnj/∂pnj
− cnj = 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (12)
Besides on the bid amounts pnj and the bidders characteristics Anj, the winning probabilities
Pnj depend on the preferences {ρ,α} of the buyer. By inserting our estimates {ρˆ, αˆ}, we
directly arrive at estimates Pˆnj for the winning probabilities:
Pˆnj =
eρˆpnj+αˆAnj∑Jn
k=1 e
ρˆpnk+αˆAnk
(13)
With these, the first order conditions (12) can be solved directly for estimates ĉnj of the
bidders’ costs cnj.
 Counterfactual Simulation. Our counterfactual assumption is that quality infor-
mation is concealed from the bidders. In this case the bidders’ subjective perception of the
buyers’ decision process in a certain auction n is
max
j∈{1,...,Jn}
unj, where
unj = −pnj + ˜nj for j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}. (14)
The ˜nj are given as the sum of the error terms nj and the (unobserved) quality-draws qnj,
that is ˜nj = qnj + nj. Thus, the distribution of the ˜nj results from the convolution of the
density of the nj with the bidders’ belief about the density of the quality distribution.
For reasons of computational feasibility we make the assumption that the error terms
˜nj = qnj + nj follow a type I extreme value distribution.
17 In order to derive plausible
counterfactual estimates we assume that bidders’ beliefs about the moments of the quality
distribution coincide with the empirical moments of the quality distribution. This implies
17Note that our results are not driven by specific assumptions about the distributions of the nj and the
˜nj . As long as these distributions are continuous, single-peaked and have no fat tails, our qualitative results
hold. What is of relevance for our results is just the relationship between the variance of the j and the
variance of the ˜j .
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Mean SD Median
Actual bidamounts (pnj) 559 e 514 e 400 e
Estimated costs (cˆnj) 450 e 518 e 304 e
Counterfactual bidamounts (pˆnj) 586 e 512 e 435 e
Table 3: Estimated costs and counterfactual bidamounts. The results are based on data from 1,928
auctions with on average 7.8 participating bidders. All auctions were conducted during the second half of
2008.
that the bidders’ beliefs about the moments of the distribution of the error terms ˜nj coincide
with the empirical moments of the ˜nj. We can get information about the empirical moments
of the ˜nj by simply running a logit estimation with only the bidders’ prices included as
covariates. We get that Var[˜nj] = 1.55 Var[nj].
18 We now can formulate the bidders’ first
order conditions in the no information case as
pˆnj +
Pˆnj
∂Pˆnj/∂pˆnj
− cˆnj = 0, j ∈ {1, ..., Jn}, (15)
where
Pˆnj =
e
1√
1.55
ρˆpˆnj
e
1√
1.55
vˆn0 +
∑Jn
k=1 e
1√
1.55
ρˆpˆnk
. (16)
We solve conditions (15) numerically for estimates pˆnj of bidders’ equilibrium prices in the
no information case.
With estimates pˆnj of the counterfactual bids we can calculate the counterfactual ag-
gregate utility of the buyers: Following Small and Rosen (1981), for type I extreme value
distributed error terms j the change in expected utility of the buyer in an auction n can be
18We get information about the relationship between the variance of the j and that of the ˜j by comparing
the price coefficient from the logit estimation with only the prices included as covariates to the price coefficient
of the logit estimation with also bidders’ non-price characteristics included as covariates.
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Actual Counterfactual
(Information case) (No information case)
Average price quotes 559 e
+5%−−−→ 586 e
Average buyer’s utility 0 e
−8%−−−→ -34 e
(monetary equivalent, normalized)
Average auction turnover 425 e
+8%−−−→ 462 e
Table 4: Results of counterfactual analysis, related to outcome of one representative auction.
The results are based on data from 1,928 auctions with on average 7.8 participating bidders. All auctions
were conducted during the second half of 2008.
calculated as
∆EUn = EUn − E˜Un = ln
(
Jn∑
j=1
eρˆpnj+αˆAnj
)
− ln
(
Jn∑
j=1
eρˆpˆnj+αˆAnj
)
The change in buyers’ aggregate utility if quality information was concealed is then simply
given as
∆EUtotal =
N∑
n=1
∆EUn (17)
Division by ρˆ delivers the monetary equivalents of the utility values.
We used data from all auctions from the painting and wallpapering category which were
performed during the second half of 2008 and for which we have information about the
cost factors available to compute the aggregate welfare of the buyers and the total platform
turnover for the counterfactual case of concealed quality information. As we find, in case
quality information was concealed, on average bidders final price quotes increase by 5%
(compare table 3). The expected counterfactual turnover in all auctions considered increases
from 820,000 euros to 890,000 euros (i.e. an increase of 8%). Using formula (17), we also
find that the aggregate utility of the buyers decreases by the monetary equivalent of around
65,000 euros, which corresponds to 8% of total auction turnover.
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 Discussion. Our counterfactual results were derived using our theoretical frameworks
for the case of disclosed and the case of concealed quality information, and the assumption
that bidders’ actual behavior can be described by the model for the case of disclosed quality
information. Before we discuss the general assumptions underlying both our frameworks,
let us address our assumption that our information case model describes actual bidders’
behavior. We already mentioned that in our application information about bidders’ non-
price characteristics is publicly available, and that bidders can derive information about
the buyers’ preferences from observations of buyers’ former decisions. Thus, bidders should
possess quality information. However, the fact that bidders possess quality information does
not mean that they necessarily incorporate this information in their pricing decisions. In
order to test whether bidders actually do incorporate quality information in their pricing
decisions we therefore employed a reduced form model to identify the bidders’ reaction to
a quality shock. Details are given in appendix A.3. We found that bidders react to the
appearance of an in terms of quality very strong rival by an average price reduction of about
90 euros, which is quite drastic given an average bidamount of 560 euros. This behavior is
in line with the implications of our model for the case of disclosed quality information. For
this reason we are convinced that our information case model is suited to describe actual
bidders’ behavior.
Let us turn now to the general assumptions underlying both our theoretical frameworks.
Our frameworks abstract from inter-auction dynamics. For the development of our frame-
works we assumed that both buyers and bidders do not behave strategically across auctions.
We think this assumption is reasonable for our application: First, as during the time period
considered each buyer on average auctions off only one contract we can exclude strategic
inter-auction behavior of buyers. Second, as the probability of repeated encounters between
bidders is quite low (around 12%, see table 1), it should be reasonable to assume that if at
all phenomenons like tacit collusion play a negligible role. We also do not think that explicit
collusion in a given auction plays a role: For once, bidders are not able to communicate with
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each other on the online platform. Then, as shown on the map in figure 2, most auctions are
procuring jobs in large cities/metropolitan areas. There, in contrast to rural areas, bidders
should not know about the whole pool of potential rivals, what makes interactions between
them apart from that on the platform quite unlikely. Thus, interaction among bidders par-
ticipating in a certain auction and between these bidders and the buyer should be restricted
to happen during this auction.
A slightly different concern might be that some bidders behave strategically across auc-
tions due to capacity constraints, e.g. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2000). However, most
auctions are about smaller jobs which should take about one to three days to complete (as
shown in table 1, the median startprice set is around 500 euros), and in the time span we
consider (half a year) the average number of auction participations is around four. Thus,
we do not think that capacity constraints do play a major role here. To summarize, we
think that modeling each auction in an isolated manner is a reasonable approach for our
application.
We further made the assumption that a bidding equilibrium emerges in each auction. In
particular, this assumption implies that dynamic phenomenons like sniping do not occur in
our application. Given the numbers in table 1 this assumption seems to be justified: On
average the last bid is placed well before the end of an auction, meaning that sniping seems
to play no role in our data. Thus, the assumption that in each auction in our application an
equilibrium is achieved should be justified.
Finally notice that the framework we consider is purely static, it clearly does not consider
entry or exit of buyers or bidders. Especially for business models in the very dynamic online
markets those aspects are of crucial importance, however. Very often rapid growth is much
more important than instantaneous profits.19 A formal consideration of the dynamic aspects
19The prototypic example of a company engaged in online markets which focuses its strategy on long-run
growth but not short-run profits is Amazon. In a recent interview for HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business
Review Jeff Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, states: “Percentage margins are not one of the things we are
seeking to optimize. It’s the absolute dollar-free cash flow per share that you want to maximize, [...]” And
later on: “[W]e believe by keeping our prices very, very low, we earn trust with customers over time, and
that that actually does maximize free cash flow over the long term.” (Source: Interview with Jeff Bezos,
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such as the long run profitability of firm growth in a specific sector by far exceeds the bounds
of our structural analysis. Nevertheless our analysis can crucially contribute to questions
arising in this broader context. The current information regime on the platform seems
to especially benefit buyers since they face lower bids as compared to the counterfactual
situation where all non-price information is concealed. If the most challenging task to achieve
the long run growth objectives of the online platform indeed is to attract as many buyers as
possible, then the current information regime seems to be the right approach to implement
those objectives.
5 Concluding remarks
Non-binding reverse auctions are establishing as one of the most prominent tools for
electronic procurement activities both for firms and government organizations. Whereas
in non-binding auctions typically no structure is imposed on the buyer’s decision process,
important design questions arise, however, with respect to the information regime throughout
the bidding process. We added to the understanding of this auction format by analyzing the
effects of different designs of the information structure of an open non-binding auction.
After establishing a formal framework we first observed that the buyers prefer that in-
formational arrangement which creates higher competitive pressure among bidders. As we
show, which of the informational regimes indeed induces more competitive pressure crucially
depends on the precise situation considered. Thus, from a theory point of view none of the
regimes dominates.
To obtain further insights on the impact of the information regimes in non-binding auc-
tions for real market situations we then conduct an empirical analysis based on an extensive
data set from a large European online procurement platform. The informational setup on
this platform is such that bidders are informed about each others’ qualities. Building on our
formal framework, we perform a counterfactual welfare analysis to assess the consequences
HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review, January 3, 2013.)
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of concealing non-price information from the bidders. As we find on average this leads to an
increase of bidders’ prices by 5%, an increase in auction turnover by 8%, and a decrease in
buyers’ welfare by 8%.
The final policy recommendation implied by those results clearly depends very much
on the final objectives of the online platform. Consider for example the rather plausible
case where the crucially important objective is not given by the maximization of short run
turnover but the long run growth of the company which can mainly be achieved through the
attraction of large amounts of buyers posting their procurement inquiries. Then our results
clearly show that the current information regime to reveal all non-price information is the
one to best implement this objective.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 2:
As the firms’ first order conditions given in propositions 1 and 2 are transcendental given
any standard assumption about the distribution of the error terms i, it is impossible to
derive closed form solutions for the equilibrium prices in both the information and the no
information case. In order to demonstrate that no information structure weakly dominates
the other we thus resort to the use of numerical simulations.
We look at an auction with two bidding firms. The costs of the firms are c = (c1, c2) =
(0, 1). We make the assumption that the error terms i are iid type I extreme value dis-
tributed, and that the distribution of quality f(qj) is discrete: q1 shall be drawn with prob-
ability 0.1, q2 with probability 0.9.
Then for q = (q1, q2) = (0, 1) we get EU − E˜U = 0.75. Thus, for these parameter
values the buyer prefers the information case over the no information case. In contrast, for
q = (0, 3) we get EU− E˜U = −0.34. With these parameter values the buyer prefers the no
information case over the information case.
A.2 First order series approximation:
 Derivation of analytical results using a first order series approximation:
If we assume the error terms j to follow a symmetric distribution, the first order Taylor
approximation of the cumulative distribution function of 2 − 1 around zero is given by
F2−1(x) ≈
1
2
+
1
a
x. (A1)
1
a
equals the first derivative of F2−1 at zero. Note that in general the quality of this
approximation is good for values close to zero and worsens for values of x far from zero. A
further discussion of this issue can be found below.
˜j is defined as ˜j = j + qj. If also the qj follow a symmetric distribution the first order
Taylor approximation of F˜2−˜1 around zero is given by
F˜2−˜1(x) ≈
1
2
+
1
a˜
x. (A2)
1
a˜
equals the first derivative of F˜2−˜1 at zero. The variance of the distribution of ˜j is at
least equal to max{Var(j),Var(qj)} (as ˜j = j + qj). Therefore, the variance of ˜2− ˜1 is at
least as large as the variance of 2− 1. Thus, as the derivative of the cdf of a symmetrically
distributed random variable at zero decreases with the variance of the random variable, it
holds that 0 < a ≤ a˜ < 1. Note that if Var(qj) = 0 then a˜ = a.
The firms’ winning probabilities in the information case are
P1(p,q) = P (2 − 1 ≤ p2 − q2 − p1 + q1),
P2(p,q) = P (2 − 1 > p2 − q2 − p1 + q1).
If the Pj in the first order conditions given in proposition 1 are expressed using the ap-
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proximation (A1), it is straightforward to solve these systems after the equilibrium prices
p∗:
p∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2)− 1
3
(q2 − q1) + a
2
,
p∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
1
3
(q2 − q1) + a
2
.
The firms’ winning probabilities in the no information case are
P˜1(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 ≤ p˜2 − p˜1),
P˜2(p,q) = P (˜2 − ˜1 > p˜2 − p˜1).
Using the first order conditions in proposition 2 and the approximation (A2), it follows that
the equilibrium prices in the no information case are given as
p˜∗1 =
1
3
(2c1 + c2) +
a˜
2
,
p˜∗2 =
1
3
(c1 + 2c2) +
a˜
2
.
From simply comparing (p∗1, p
∗
2) to (p˜
∗
1, p˜
∗
2), it follows that
p∗1 = p˜
∗
1 −
1
3
(q2 − q1)− a˜− a
2
,
p∗2 = p˜
∗
2 +
1
3
(q2 − q1)− a˜− a
2
.
According to Small and Rosen (1981) the change in the buyer’s expected utility from a
change in the information structure can be computed as
∆EU = EU− E˜U =
∫ (W1,W2)
(W˜1,W˜2)
{P1(W1,W2)dW1 + [1− P1(W1,W2)]dW2} ,
where W1 = q1−p1, W2 = q2−p2, (W˜1, W˜2) = (q1− p˜∗1, q2− p˜∗2), (W1,W2) = (q1−p∗1, q2−p∗2)
and P1(W1,W2) =
1
2
+ a(W1 −W2). Some algebra delivers
EU− E˜U = 1
3a
(q2 − q1) [(c2 − c1)− 2(q2 − q1)]
+
1
4
(2aa˜+ a˜2 − 3a2)
+(
a˜
2a
− 1
2
)(c2 + c1 − q2 − q1),
as stated in the main body of the text.
 Discussion of the quality of the series approximation: In discrete choice models
the error terms j are commonly assumed to follow either a type I extreme value or a standard
normal distribution.
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Figure 3: Graph of a standard logistic distribution (variance equals σ2SLD) and a logistic distri-
bution with variance of 4σ2SLD. The left graph depicts a standard logistic distribution and its first order
approximation around zero. The vertical lines indicate a deviation of plus/minus one standard deviation
from zero. The right graph depicts a logistic distribution with variance four times as large as that of a
standard logistic distribution and its first order series approximation around zero. The vertical lines in each
graph indicate a deviation of plus/minus one standard deviation of the standard logistic distribution from
zero.
We exemplarily discuss the quality of the first order series approximation for the assump-
tion that the j and the ˜j follow a type I extreme value distribution. (As ˜j is defined as
˜j = qj + j it holds that Var[˜j] ≥ Var[j].) This assumption implies that the difference
2 − 1 follows a standard logistic distribution and the difference ˜2 − ˜1 follows a logistic
distribution with a larger variance.
The linear approximation of the cumulative distribution of a standard logistic distribution
is given as
F2−1(x) =
1
2
+
1
4
x. (A3)
The left graph in figure 3 exemplarily depicts the cumulative distribution function of a
standard logistic distribution and the linear approximation of it around zero. Obviously, a
linear approximation is not suited to capture the tail behavior of the cdf, but for intermediate
values of x the course of the linear approximation is close to that of the cdf. At x = 0, the
course of the linear approximation is exactly equal to that of the cdf. With the distance
from x = 0 increasing, the course of the linear approximation begins to deviate from that of
the cdf.
In general, a linear approximation around x = 0 captures that a cdf of the kind we
consider is strictly increasing in x. What our first order approximation does not capture
is that the curvature of the cdf is changing in x. That is the magnitude of changes in the
firms’ (perceived) winning probabilities caused by changes in the firms’ prices depends on
the values of the prices before the change, which is not captured by our linear approximation.
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Figure 4: The red lines in all three graphs confine the parameter space for which our approximation is good.
The blue lines in the first and the second graph depict the indifference lines for the buyers. For parameter
values above the indifference line the buyer prefers the no information case, for parameter values below the
indifference line the buyer prefers the information case. For the computation of the first indifference line we
assumed a = 4 and a˜ = 4, for that of the second a = 4 and a˜ = 4. For both indifference lines we assumed
c1 = 0 and q1 = 0.
However, for x values close to zero also the magnitude in changes is captured quite well. For
example in figure 3 it is shown that if x deviates up to about one standard deviation from
zero, the linear approximation captures also the curvature of the cdf quite well.
What does this mean with respect to our comparative results? We compare the case of
disclosed quality information to that of concealed quality information. At the core of our
results lies a qualitative comparison of the behavior of the firms in the case of disclosed
quality information to that in the case of concealed quality information. The behavior of
the firms is determined by the first order conditions given in propositions 1 and 2, and these
conditions in turn dependent on the Pj respectively P˜j and their first derivatives. If quality
information is disclosed, the winning probabilities Pj of the firms are determined by the cdf
of 1 − 2, if quality information is concealed the perceived winning probabilities P˜j of the
firms are determined by the cdf of ˜1 − ˜2. Thus, we are able to make correct qualitative
comparisons between the case of disclosed and that of concealed quality information as long
as our approximations to the cdf of 1− 2 respectively to that of ˜1− ˜2 preserve qualitative
relationships between these cdfs as they are relevant in the firms’ first order conditions.
Concretely, that means as long as our model parameters are such that the arguments of Pj
and P˜j in equilibrium, (p
∗
1− p∗2)− (q1− q2) and p˜∗1− p˜∗2, are in an area where the qualitative
relationships between the levels and between the first derivates of the cdfs of 1 − 2 and
˜1 − ˜2 are preserved, we are able to draw meaningful qualitative conclusions.
As the cumulative distribution function of a logistic distribution becomes less steep
around zero with increasing variance (see the right graph in figure 3), the range in which the
first order series approximation is reasonably good widens with increasing variance. Thus
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a first order series approximation preserves the qualitative relationships between the levels
and between the first derivates of the cdf of a standard logistic distribution and the cdf of a
logistic distribution with higher variance if the argument of the distribution functions lies in
between around plus/minus one standard deviation (σSLD) of the standard logistic distribu-
tion. σSLD is equal to 1.81. It is easy to show that both in the information case and the no
information case the arguments of the cumulative distribution functions lie in between +/-
σSLD if |c2 − c1| ≤ σSLD and |(q2 − q1)− (c2 − c1)| ≤ σSLD.
Note that all the qualitative results we derive hold within parameter ranges for which
our approximation is good. This can be seen from the graphs in figure 4. The red lines in
each graph constrain the area of parameter values for which our approximation is good. The
two left graphs demonstrate that our finding that the buyer’s preferences with respect to the
information structure depend on the specific parameters of a given auction holds within the
set of parameters for which our approximation is good and also for different β. The graph
on the right demonstrates that also our finding that the influence of higher uncertainty in
the no information case is unclear ex ante holds within the set of parameters for which our
approximation is good. Thus, all our qualitative findings are not simply artifacts of our
approximation.
A.3 Analysis of the information state of the bidders
In section 2 we proposed two models to describe bidders’ behavior in open non-binding
auctions. Here we use a reduced form model to very that observed bidders’ behavior is
indeed in line with the predictions of our information case model. In particular, we exploit
contrasting testable predictions of both the information case and the no information case
framework: If bidders behave according to our information case model, they should react
to changes in the quality composition of an auction. In particular, they should show a
strong reaction to the appearance of a high quality opponent. In contrast, if bidders behave
according to our no information case model they should not exhibit changed bidding behavior
as a reaction to different qualities of rivals.
 Econometric model. We test for these contrasting implications by using the follow-
ing simple reduced form model of the bidders’ pricing behavior:
pnj = ξKnj + βSnj + aj + νnj. (A4)
This reduced form model describes the bidders’ pricing behavior along the lines of our theo-
retical frameworks from section 2. Basically we assume that the price bidder j puts forward
in auction n depends on his costs cnj and, in case of disclosed quality information, on his
quality relative to that of his rivals. We assume the costs cnj to depend on the observable
cost factors Knj and on unobserved factors which capture essentially bidder j’s opportunity
costs for the job offered in auction n and his efficiency. How bidder j fares in terms of quality
relative to his rivals in auction n is assumed to depend on bidder j’s strength in terms of
quality relative to the whole population of bidders and an unobserved auction-specific devi-
ation. Both bidder j’s efficiency and his overall strength in terms of quality are captured in
the bidder specific constant aj. The error terms νj capture bidder j’s opportunity costs for
the job offered in auction n and the auction-specific deviation to this overall strength.
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The binary variable Snj indicates whether bidder j has to face a rival bidder who is
strong in terms of quality. We know from our theoretical considerations that if ceteris
paribus a rival of bidder j is replaced by one who is stronger in terms of quality, if quality
information is disclosed bidder j should react with a decrease in his price. In contrast, if
quality information is concealed, bidder j should show no reaction. That means we expect
β < 0 if bidders behave according to our information case model, and β = 0 otherwise.
 Identification strategy. We restrict our analysis to bidders which are observed in
several auctions. In doing so, we loose some estimation efficiency, but as the number of
observations available remains quite high that does not matter much. What we gain is the
possibility to estimate equation (A4) by mean-differencing (that is, employing a fixed effects
estimator), and by that we get rid of the individual specific and unobserved constants aˆj.
The assumption which has to hold for our estimates to be consistent is that the nj are
mean-independent from the observable costs elements Knj and the strong rival indicator
Snj. As we will discuss in more detail below, this assumption is likely to hold in our case.
 Estimation. We define that a given bidder j encounters a strong rival in auction n if
at least one of the other bidders in auction n has a difference of positive and negative ratings
of at least 90:20
Snj =
{
1 if encounter with bidder with (no. of pos. ratings - no. of neg. ratings) ≥ 90,
0 otherwise.
As we want to estimate equation (A4) by a fixed effects estimator, we have to restrict our
sample to bidders which are observed in at least two auctions. This leaves us with a sample
of 941 bidders, taking part in 1,498 auctions (the mean number of auction participations is
10, the median number is 6). In 22.2% of these auctions a bidder with a ratings difference
of at least 90 takes part.
Table 5 shows our estimation results. The first column displays our base specification.
In column two we add dummies to control for auction size and region dummies to control
for regional influences.21 The coefficients on the costs factors do not vary much between
the specifications, and they are of reasonable size: A professional tradesman in Germany
charges on average 5 to 6 EUR per painted square meter. This includes painting, paint,
cleaning and travel. The average area to be painted in our data set is 138.3 m2, the average
travel distance 45.0 km (one-way). Together with our estimation results in table 5 this
implies that the average price per square meter painted, including paint and travel, is about
3 to 4 EUR on the auction platform. Given that most of the bidders on the platform are
non-professionals,22 this number seems to be plausible. In both specifications the coefficient
on the strong rival indicator Snj is highly significant and strongly negative, meaning that
bidders bid more competitive if they encounter a strong rival: they lower their bids by around
90 EUR, which is a quite strong reduction if one considers that the average bid amount in
our sample is about 550 EUR.
 Discussion of estimation results. Our estimation results suggest that bidders react
20For comparison the mean difference of positive and negative ratings in our sample is 5.8. 1% of the
bidders in our sample have a ratings difference of at least 90.
21We define auctions to be from the same region when the first digit of their zip code is identical.
2278% of the bidders in our sample are neither master craftsmen nor senior journeymen.
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Dependent variable:
Bid amount of bidder j
in auction n (1) (2) (3) (4)
Strong rival (dummy) -82.85∗∗∗ -91.57∗∗∗ -93.79∗∗∗ -59.96∗∗∗
(14.89) (17.73) (17.77) (12.60)
Controls:
Area to paint (m2) 1.72∗∗∗ 1.74∗∗∗ 1.61∗∗∗ .59∗∗∗
Area to paper (m2) 1.41∗∗∗ 1.28∗∗∗ 1.29∗∗∗ .05
Paper removal (m2) 2.72∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 2.54∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗
Cleaning (dummy) 77.63∗∗∗ 64.08∗∗ 54.01∗ -46.38
Reparation (dummy) 40.60∗∗∗ 56.39∗∗∗ 42.30∗∗∗ 29.65∗∗∗
Priming (dummy) 124.60∗∗∗ 125.44∗∗∗ 114.41∗∗∗ 21.80
No. of windows 10.41 11.00 13.39 1.93
No. of window frames 34.31 25.40 19.41 -81.33∗∗∗
No. of doors 45.78∗∗∗ 46.23∗∗∗ 42.22∗∗∗ 34.45∗∗∗
No. of door frames 17.72∗∗∗ 18.56∗∗∗ 18.21∗∗∗ 13.31∗∗∗
Nbr. of radiators 85.33∗∗∗ 85.58∗∗∗ 78.91∗∗∗ 27.62∗∗∗
Paint by contractor (dummy) 25.99∗∗ 14.97 18.89∗ 27.37∗∗∗
Varnish by contractor (dummy) 125.58∗ 116.82 102.01 123.63
Distance (km) 1.15∗∗∗ 1.17∗∗∗ .76∗∗∗ .52∗∗∗
Dummies for nbr. of bidders X X X
Dummies for region X X X
Controls for bidder composition X
Dummies for startprice interval X
Bidder FE’s X X X X
R2 0.292 0.300 0.341 0.508
N 9,546 9,546 9,546 9,546
Table 5: Identification of the bidders’ reaction to a strong rival; results of fixed effects esti-
mation. Dependent variable is bid amount. Covariates are a dummy indicating the appearance of strong
rival (a rival with a difference between positive and negative ratings of at least 90) and costs controls. The
panel consists of 941 bidders who on average take part in 10 auctions each. Column 4 shows results of the
fixed effects regression with dummies for different startprice intervals added. Note that these dummies are
highly correlated with the costs factors. Thus the coefficients on the costs factors in column 4 are no longer
clearly identified. Cluster-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. For all results: both within-
and between-R2 are close to the overall R2. Significance niveaus are reported by stars: ***: 1%, **: 5%, *:
10%.
to the appearance of a strong rival by lowering their bids. This verifies our assumption that
bidders behave according to our information case model. However, as mentioned during the
derivation of equation (A4) above, the coefficient at the strong rival indicator Snj, β, can
only be interpreted as the direct causal effect of the appearance of a strong rival on bidder
j’s bidding behavior if the unobserved part of equation (A4), νnj, is mean independent from
the observables Knj and Snj. νnj captures two unobserved influences on bidder j’s bid: One
stems from the composition of auction n in terms of the qualities of bidder j’s rivals, the
other stems from bidder j’s costs components.
It might be that either strong bidders select themselves into certain auctions, or that
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certain types of bidders select themselves into auctions where a strong bidder is present.
In effect, that would lead to a correlation between the appearance of a strong bidder and
the auction-specific composition in terms of bidders’ qualities. To be sure that we actually
capture the bidders reaction to the appearance of a strong rival, in column 3 of table 5 we
control for the bidder composition of the different auctions. We do so by taking the averages
over the attributes of all not extraordinarily strong bidders (bidders with a difference of
positive and negative ratings of less than 90) and using these averages as further controls
in our fixed effects regression. As can be seen, controlling for the auction composition does
not change our results. In addition, a large difference in positive and negative ratings is not
correlated with any other of a strong bidder’s attributes. Also, besides the prices put forward
the most prominent information auction participants are given is their rivals’ ratings. Thus,
we are pretty sure we are capturing the bidders’ reaction to their rivals’ differences in positive
and negative ratings.
In contrast, possibly problematic for the identification of the bidders’ information state
is correlation between the covariates and the unobserved part of equation (A4) which stems
from bidders’ costs components. If the unobserved deviation in bidders’ costs from their
expected value is systematically connected to the appearance of a strong rival, significance
of β would no longer indicate that bidders are informed about their qualities. However,
there are two reasons why we do not think that the appearance of a strong rival is cor-
related with unobserved cost factors: First, we collected our data by extracting the costs
information from the job offers as they were available to the bidders. It is quite unlikely that
we systematically missed a factor which is observable to the bidders and which indicates a
deviation in costs. Second, even if we missed a factor of this kind, it should be known to
the buyers. Before an auction starts, the buyers announce a startprice. This startprice is
announced for informational purposes, and it should be reasonable to assume that besides
at strategic considerations buyers orientate the level of the announced startprice also at the
costs of their job. So, if there is a costs factor which is unobserved by us as researchers but
known to the buyers and bidders, this costs factor should be reflected in the level of the
startprice. Auctions in which a strong rival appears actually do systematically differ from
auctions in which there is no strong rival in terms of the startprice. However, auctions in
which a strong rival appears do not have a lower, but a higher startprice, indicating that
strong rivals select themselves into auctions which seem to be quite valuable relative to the
observable costs elements. This kind of selection should work against the hypothetical effect
of the appearance of a strong rival in the case of informed bidders. As we are still able to
observe more competitive bidding when a strong rival appears, we are quite certain that the
coefficient on Snj identifies strategic bidding behavior. In addition, if we control for different
startprice intervals in the estimation of equation (A4), the coefficient on Snj stays highly
significant and negative (see column 4 of table 5).23
23Note that after the introduction of dummies for startprice intervals the coefficients on the costs factors
are in general no longer clearly identified, as the correlation between the startprice and job characteristics
like for example the area to be painted is very high.
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